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The Indigestibility of the World: Birthing the Posthuman in Spielberg’s A.I. 
Todd A. Comer 
Recent scholarship on the “posthuman” emphasizes embodiment, finitude, the 
humanizing work of representation, and ontological relation; it also tends toward a critique of 
dualism, transcendence, and the centering of the Human. These motifs are all emphasized to 
some extent because of an increasing awareness of the ethical limitations of Humanism, which 
seems in most formulations dualistic and, hence, violent: N. Katherine Hayles refers to the 
“liberal humanist subject,” a notion of identity which indicates a subject’s “freedom” from 
society (3). Neil Badmington discusses how a Cartesian humanism posits a notion of identity in 
which every human shares an “essence,” the human essence, to rationally differentiate “the true 
from the false” (Descartes’ phrase), displacing God and centering Humanity (Posthumanism 3-
4). And Derrida writes of “man and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being 
who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology--in other words, throughout his 
entire history--has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and end of 
play” (292).  
There have been numerous recent texts on posthumanism, including fine texts by Elaine 
L. Graham and Badmington. With her emphasis on an ethics of birth, Graham’s argument in 
Representations of the Post/Human provides a particularly good counterpoint for what follows. 
Graham opposes “necrophilia” to “natality,” desiring to replace the West’s focus on death with 
birth, and thereby emphasize our “shared origin in birth which necessarily embeds us in common 
experiences, both biological and social, and commits all living beings to sociability, 
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interdependence and embodiment” (81). Graham, following Bruno Latour, posits that there are 
two “epistemological strategies” in modernity that ensure its “ontological stability” (33-34): The 
first strategy is “purification,” the categorizing of “species, classes and states of being.” The 
second strategy is “translation,” a process by which hybrids are made of nature and culture. It is 
purification, of hybridity and of modernity’s others, that naturalizes modernity’s “privileged 
categories” (i.e., the Human). The “post/human,” which is not a “condition” but an 
“intervention” that allows us to recognize the constructed nature of humanism (37), occurs at the 
moment that this purification process falters due to a “greater profligacy” of hybrids (35). She 
writes: 
At the boundaries of humanity, machines and nature, the impossibility of fixed 
definitions is shown forth in the proliferation of contemporary signs and wonders. 
In their capacity to show up the “leakiness” of bodily boundaries . . . this 
emergent array of hybrid creatures are arguably “monstrous” not so much in the 
horror they evoke but in their exposure of the redundancy and instability of the 
ontological hygiene of the humanist subject. (12) 
Graham’s book lacks a close focus on space and ontology, making it difficult to see how this 
“instability” precisely operates. Against what I see as her basic argument that the confrontation 
with hybrids causes a post/human “intervention,” I will argue for a sublime confrontation with 
birth. 
 Badmington’s Alien Chic: Posthumanism and the Other Within, by contrast, describes in 
much greater detail the ontological nature of the “posthuman.” His  Derrida-inflected argument 
does not attempt to show that we are now in a period of “posthumanity” (145), so much as show 
how the binary of human/alien deconstructs itself as it oscillates between presence and absence, 
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and in this “wandering” is the “possibility of posthumanism.” He writes of Roswell, a television 
series: 
The human is never quite at home with itself, and never without the alien . . . 
Within its stories, the signifiers “human” and “alien” are rearticulated until the 
relationship between them is no longer one of absolute difference. Neither the 
human nor the alien is ever entirely revealed in the plenitude of opposition; there 
is a repeated deferral, an endless retreat from humanism. (134)  
The problem, often, is love, he argues in relation to 1956’s Invasion of the Body Snatchers (141-
143), for “desire escapes its vows,” leading humans to desire aliens in a decidedly non-human 
fashion, undermining the binary, and giving rise to the posthuman (138). Desire, he continues, 
“never falls under the control of the subject of humanism” (140). (In what follows, desire will 
play, in large part, the opposite role: Desire sustains the human until a certain absolute 
representation is engineered.) 
While the human subject generally conforms to what others, including Graham and 
Badmington, have said about its foundation in “absolute difference” or its strategy of 
“purification,” I argue that the embodied activities that create humanism are localized within the 
family. Specifically, families teach us how to eat in the literal embodied sense and, more 
importantly, in the following ontological sense: Family is the space within which we learn how 
to digest (or, in a Latourian sense, purify) the world--the essential mark of humanism. 
Subjectivity is created by ingesting a world of difference. Such poor (i.e., violent) table manners 
are fueled by an incessant, if illusory, traumatic lack which creates the desire that orients and, 
concomitantly, creates hungry subjects. This digestive (and representational) cycle is the essence 
of humanism, fueling the engineering of the world into more and more human dimensions. But 
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what happens at the apex of this trajectory when humans engineer their ultimate mirror, that is, 
an artificial entity which perfectly mirrors back to them their humanity?  
This essay uses Steven Spielberg’s Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) to argue that something 
has changed: “Posthumanity” has appeared because this digestion has paused. To be Human is to 
lack, to always drive forward while repressing the past, the artifice of our birth, as we mold the 
world in our image. However, in a strange way, with cloning and other technologies, this 
digestion is interrupted; “we” humans have succeeded too well in our masterful creation of an 
absolute representation of humanity, and have lost our impetus. This mastery, secondly, leads us 
to experience birth in a new way. No longer can we easily digest birth (and its others) and move 
on. No, birth now surrounds us like an immense, sublime ocean, undermining us as desiring 
subjects.1  
 
Family Identity, Narrative, and the Limits of Digestion 
A.I. begins in mourning. Martin, the son of Monica and Henry, is cryogenically frozen 
due to a medical condition for which science has yet to find a cure. He exists as both present and 
absent, alive and dead, and this is a reality that is excruciating for Monica. Their doctor says to 
Henry, “She is in the most difficult position of feeling she should mourn the death of your son. 
After five years your instincts tell you to mourn him, too. But medicine assures us that mourning 
is inappropriate, that Martin is merely pending, so all her grief goes undigested.” Death, an 
ontological wound in presence, is difficult to digest, but what we have here--through the 
advancement of medicine--is a cryogenic state with which humans have no previous coping 
experience (indeed, in a much more material sense than in the case of death, Martin is still 
present and absent). Even so, Monica reads to her son. She reads The Adventures of Robin Hood, 
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specifically the pages dealing with the birth of Maid Marian’s son, also named Martin. Robin 
Hood, as a birth narrative in this case, operates as a therapeutic narrative, assimilating the 
experience of “mourning” (or cryogenic freezing). The issues that I wish to elaborate on are 
nicely introduced here. Either subjectivity is gathered together into a well-bordered absolute with 
the assistance of narrative, or it is torn, “exposed” (Jean-Luc Nancy Inoperative 39) to a world of 
relation (both of presence and absence) that it cannot fully digest.  
 We only begin to see how some of these issues are coupled in a different manner after 
David enters the frame. In a situation which approximately duplicates that of Monica and Martin, 
Professor Hobby designs David after the likeness of his deceased son, also named David. David, 
as an artificial creation of Humanity, here operates similarly to narrative in that he also assuages 
mourning. David is intended as a child substitute for couples, like Monica and Henry, who 
cannot have children or whose children are terminally ill and resigned to a cryogenic state. As an 
artificial creation he serves to heal the familial world and preserve its sense.   
 David is the result of an attempt to create a “mecha” that will precisely model human 
emotional responses. As Sheila, a mecha, informs us, “love is first widening my eyes a little bit 
and quickening my breathing a little” and so on. Like a human, David will also love and not just 
artificially simulate its physiological manifestations. Hobby’s implicit assumption, of course, is 
that human, or real, identity is not in any way a matter of simulation. On the side of the real is 
immanent identity, a subjectival being which does not ostentatiously rehearse how to act (based 
on an exterior movement, or imitation), but (seemingly) reacts immediately, wholly out of itself, 
and with ease to the call for emotion. This is what it means to be Human; anything else is 
artificial and the lesser half of the binary.  
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Trauma has exposed the family to the outside, to a non-recognition (Nancy Inoperative 
43). This family unit, or representation, is dispersed in the aftermath of Martin’s illness. Directly 
following a scene in which David is glancing over a series of family pictures which include 
Martin (but not David), Henry is shown explaining the rules according to which David can be 
imprinted. As he explains, a bathroom mirror reflects them not once, but in perhaps a dozen 
perspectives, as if they have their existence, somehow, outside of themselves. Both of these 
scenes underline the fragility of the family representation; the former in particular, in light of the 
absence of David from the pictures, foregrounds the painful disjunction of the idea and reality of 
the family--such representations can simply not keep up with a reality full of sickness and death. 
Before imprinting, David appears detached, with the family yet not recognizing Monica 
as mother (he is both in and outside of the family representation). When David is finally 
imprinted by Monica, he is her only child and, hence, “special,” insofar as he is immediately with 
Monica. Imprinting becomes an act of mythmaking in which it is less the words than their 
enunciation that is essential to drawing David into the presence of the family. After David listens 
to the series of random words that constitutes imprinting, he responds immediately by referring 
to Monica as “Mommy”. The work of narrative is precisely to give back identity and heal the 
family representation by making it once again immanent, erasing that deferral to the outside. In 
this case, Monica’s narrative gathers the family and gives them back a sense of themselves as a 
family. This state lasts until Martin’s recovery forces David to mediate around him before he can 
reach Monica. Such prolonged “mediation” foregrounds the work, the construction and artifice, 
that goes into that supposedly intimate relationship which we term real or natural. What had 
stabilized into a traditional family unit, is strained, though not broken. Neither David nor Martin 
feel fully in the presence of their mother, prompting Martin to emphasize the real/artificial binary 
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as a way of excluding David from the family proper and assimilating him to the outside. The 
ultimate object of this violence is the return of a world of immanence without the mediating 
presence of an other (boy). Ultimately, David is digested through his exclusion to the outside, 
“fully” within the mecha side of the binary.  
Of course, such an immanent position is never anything but an illusion. In light of the 
film’s many photographs, it becomes a question, we could say, of who will be included in the 
family portrait--the mythic representation of the family. In this struggle between David and 
Martin the problem is that the family does not yet constitute a clear picture for itself now that the 
former has returned. The struggle is completely over the question of how this family 
representation will be delineated and bordered and, ultimately, who will be included, and who 
will be excluded to the “outside.” The very work of identity then amounts to the creation of a 
(“real”) monad, a subject or essence, which perpetually elides (or digests) its (“artificial”) birth 
outside itself.  
 
Embodied, and Performing Humans 
Thus far I have shown how representation operates as a means of creating that which is 
really human and, consequently, the violent digestion of that which suggests our existence 
outside of ourselves. In what follows I will undermine this opposition between “real” and 
“artificial” and show how identity is created through a hermeneutic movement that places us 
inextricably with others. Much of A.I.’s muted horror can be traced to this displacement of the 
above binary. For instance, the horror of the early scenes is bound up in David’s strange manner 
prior to his imprinting. Consider his first appearance at the dinner table. He silently stares at 
Monica and Henry as they eat until he finally picks up an empty glass and “drinks.” Then he 
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stares squarely at Monica and, having no stomach, mimics her eating, once again with no food. 
When some pasta fails to make it into Monica’s mouth, a few threads hanging, undigested, out 
the right corner, he laughs loudly, and hysterically. Why is the viewer spooked by this scene? 
We are horrified because the scene confronts us with identity’s groundlessness. Identity’s 
essence is existence if we understand existence as the constant self-interpretation that occurs 
prior to rational consciousness and inserts us in the world in a profound referential manner 
(Dreyfus 12-17). Each of us “embodies an understanding of what it means to be” in our reliance 
on shared social practices. Heidegger writes that the “closest kind of association is not mere 
perceptual cognition, but, rather, a handling, using, and taking care of things which has its own 
kind of ‘knowledge’” (German page numbers 67). In this case, it is both Monica’s failure to 
digest, and David’s improper laughter that foregrounds this groundless identity construction.  
 The knowledge that David is not “real” does not balance out the fact that he appears 
human. The Flesh Fair provides a telling instance of how David is interpreted as real because he 
conforms to social practice. This “celebration of life” is defined by its opposition to all that is 
artificial. An announcer shouts, “What about us? We are alive and this is a celebration of life. 
And this is a commitment to a truly human future!” About to have David killed, Johnson-
Johnson argues that while David is a product of “artistry” and craftsmanship, he only 
“perform[s],” or simulates, and is only the most recent of “insults to human dignity.” The crowd 
saves David, but less because he looks human than because he acts like one. When David pleads 
for his life a member of the crowd shouts that he “looks like a boy” but only after commenting 
that mecha “do not plead for their lives.” In conforming to normative social practices, David 
finds empathy. 
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 I am reminded of Heidegger’s example of the “handy” tool which is taken for granted 
until it is broken (73-74). Once broken its relation (“reference”) to its wielder and the world 
around it is made conspicuous. The state of being broken forces us to recognize our relation and 
dependence on the world around us, which is to say, that we are in the world and not monadic 
subjects. David’s eventual ill-advised and literal ingestion does land him in a mecha[nic] shop, 
but I want to emphasize conspicuousness on the level of social etiquette: David and Monica’s 
faulty “eating” can be read in at least two ways. To return to the motif of digestion, it can be 
understood as a metaphor for the impossibility of immanence. While our ingestion scoops up the 
exterior world and tidily assimilates it to our insides, it always misses something, the pasta lolls 
out of the corner of the mouth, we fumble the fork and it clatters across a plate. The digestion of 
difference (or artifice, in terms of the Flesh Fair) is doomed to failure.  
Secondly, David’s “eating” foregrounds the socialization process which might be better 
described as a hermeneutic process. It highlights the fact that we are not essence but existence, 
creating, interpreting, and practicing our being, constantly searching for a resolution of reality 
with the idea we have of that reality, whether our idea is of the family, or the Humanist subject 
which are, indeed, the same in this context. Jean-Luc Nancy makes a distinction between the 
architecture of “meaning” and the metaphysical signification that results from the open 
architecture of the hermeneutic circle. Meaning is essentially “open” in that the “subject” 
constantly anticipates meaning; meaning therefore cannot be a prior origin or telos, but is rather 
formed because of this lack and through anticipation: “understanding is possible only by an 
anticipation of meaning which is or constitutes meaning itself” (Raffoul xii). Essentially, David’s 
mimicking of “eating” then is a hermeneutic attempt to inscribe himself in such a way that he 
closes the gap between his inept social skills (reality) and a particular idea of table etiquette. 
 10 
Whether this is read as the actual act of ingestion or, more generally, as an issue of the 
assimilation of difference in which success would amount to being part of the family and/or fully 
human, the end result would be metaphysical. His actions should be thought of as a matter of 
signification, an attempt to resolve the distance between the sensible and the intelligible which 
would then amount to the presentation of “meaning” in, for instance, a family portrait (Nancy, 
Gravity 22-23). 
David’s letters are perhaps the best way to see how the hermeneutic and representational 
work together. While one of these letters might indicate the presence of a fully present myth, the 
entire series with differing configurations--“DEAR MOMMY/I’M REALLY OUR SON/AND I 
HATE TEDDY/HE IS NOT REAL,” or “DEAR MOMMY/I’M YOUR LITTLE/BOY AND SO 
IS/MARTIN BUT NOT/TEDDY”--demonstrates David’s anguished hermeneutic attempt to 
resolve this tension between reality and the human family. He writes several letters because he is 
attempting to correctly signify an idea of family that remains distant. The stakes of this 
resolution are high, “Before the terrifying or maddening abyss that is opened between the 
possibility that thought is empty and the correlative possibility that reality is chaos . . . 
signification is the assurance that closes the gaping void by rendering its two sides 
homogeneous. Reality has an order to it, and reason orders the real” (Nancy, Gravity 23). And it 
is upon the human subject that all of this hinges. This closing of the hermeneutic circle is 
simultaneously the work of the subject and what makes the subject be in the first place.  
All of this also dramatizes how the subject and narrative are not immediate and 
immanent, but the product of a prior hermeneutic exteriority, or mediation, which is continually 
erased as the subject becomes present: Shortly after the mecha woman (mentioned above) 
describes love, she begins applying cosmetics to her face. There is an immediate cut to Monica 
 11 
who is engaged in the same act. The act of putting cosmetics on is associated with the simulation 
of love and then, crucially, identified with the human Monica. The ostentatious binary between 
humans and mecha would place immediate action on the side of humanity. Here that binary is 
strained, or founders, perhaps, from the viewers’ standpoint: Both “organic” and “mechanical” 
life forms require a resolution of the sensible and intelligible before a “real” emotion (identity) 
can be presented. Both mecha and orga have to engage in an unconscious hermeneutic work 
before they can be seen as real. Immanence and identity, once again, only exist as such when this 
prior practice or birthing is repressed. Such a moment of signification is what creates 
“commonsense” metaphysical distinctions such as that between “real” and “artificial.” 
Badmington’s work is deeply interested in such moments in which the “absolute difference” 
between alien and human is undermined, as alien features are found in the human, or human 
features are found in the alien. With Badmington, I agree that at such moments “the boundaries 
marked out with such confidence and clarity by anthropocentrism have been breached” (Alien 
Chic 131), at least for the viewer. To a large extent, Spielberg’s film does, in fact, operate 
formally in such a way, though all such breaches need, additionally, to be framed by what Darko 
Suvin describes as the essential work of science fiction: “cognitive estrangement” (4). A.I. 
estranges us from humanity, and from our world, making the viewer see both in a new, 
denaturalized light. However, with my ultimate emphasis on a diegetic sublime, I am after 
something more radical than estrangement. 
 
Interrupting Humanism: Birth and the Posthuman 
In Rouge City, David asks Dr. Know how a mecha can be made real. He is told to travel 
to the “end of the world where the lions weep” and seek out Hobby. In this future world, global 
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warming has melted the ice caps. The oceans have become bloated and overrun countless cities. 
Most of Manhattan’s buildings are covered by water. Lady Liberty, perhaps the Humanist icon, 
barely lifts her enlightened torch above the waves. This is Manhattan, “a mecha restricted zone,” 
where Man (fails to) resist(s) that which would undermine his identity and reveal his artificial 
nature. In the first few moments of the film, a voiceover explains that millions have starved in 
this future world and that first world nations have “licensed pregnancy” and turned to mecha as a 
means of ensuring a stable way of life. The narrator refers to mecha as an “essential . . . 
economic link in the chain mail of society,” nicely summing up both the economic nature of 
identity as well as its obsessive construction of an inside and an outside. 
As the voiceover commences, we see the ocean followed by a fade into a statue of a man 
with outstretched hands and a peacock base which conveys a sense of flight, power, and 
immortality. It is the business logo of Cybertronics, David’s manufacturer. As the camera draws 
back, we realize that we are behind a rain-swept window looking out at the statue. Perhaps the 
oldest trope for birth, water is also a metaphor for that which erodes immanence. It is that which 
all representations, statues, and mecha are created to shield humans from, like chain mail, or the 
pane of glass shutting out the rain in this scene. It is fitting then that while the Cybertronics 
statue, window, and rain are still in view, Hobby begins his speech about how inventing a mecha 
“has been the dream of man since the birth of science,” advocating the design of a mecha who 
will not simulate: David. Opposed to the rain of difference outside, Hobby is concerned with a 
mythic birth of immanent subjects that will fend off the horror of death--his son’s--and the 
indefatigable rain (of difference) on the outside.  
This is, as another series of statues suggests, an impossibility. On the flight into 
Manhattan, several identical stone lions, iconic symbols of power, are found weeping, gushing 
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water out of both eyes and mouths. If subjectival identity is a matter of bringing the outside in, 
digesting difference, here is an inversion of that movement. The leonine, immanent interior has 
been exposed to the outside. Just as the melting icecaps suggest humanity’s inability to manage 
or assimilate nature, this vomited water points to the failure of the Humanist subject, and to the 
indigestibility of the world, and to the posthuman. David meets Hobby only after he has 
murdered another david, confirming his humanity through his efficacious elimination of 
difference. Hobby affirms that David is the only David, implying his individuality and his 
humanity, only to add that his son was “one-of-a-kind” and that David was at least “first-of-a-
kind.” This tension between simultaneously recognizing humanity and undermining it continues 
when Hobby tells David that he is “a real boy, at least as real as I’ve ever made one.” For him, 
David is a “success” story, the first mecha to desire and dream. Shattered, David tells Hobby that 
his “brain is falling out.” When Hobby leaves to collect David’s “real mothers and fathers,” 
David wanders around a manufacturing center, his womb. A dozen boxed davids stand in a line 
while others hang from the ceiling on what resemble meat hooks. Two lines of life-size boxes are 
each marked “David” and “Marlene.” Ad copy on the outside says, “At Last--A Love of Your 
Own.” At a particularly crucial moment, David looks through the eyes of another david. This 
face, without a cranium, is exposed to the world around it, specifically to the rain and window 
discussed earlier. David’s murder and meeting with Hobby occurs in the room adjacent to the 
aforementioned window. It is through this window that David walks only to deliberately drop to 
the water below. If the window and the building amount to humanist enclosures, the digestive 
spatiality of the Humanist subject is reversed as David leaves the building. A suggestive shot at 
the surface of the ocean follows. The camera begins filming while still placed within what we 
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can only suppose to be the building that David fell from only to move forward through shattered 
glass to the outside and to the rain. The camera recapitulates David’s indigestion.  
Subjectivity, co-originary with representation, arises as we have seen through the 
digestion of difference. David’s tortuous and repetitive attempts to write the family/Humanist 
narrative are all concerned with exactly such a digestion of difference in which the subject 
recognizes his self in that which is other, becoming in this way human. However, in the 
experience of the birth of these other davids, David’s digestion is stalled, and spatially reversed. 
Such a confrontation with birth--by contrast to the myriad examples of digestion in the film--
exceeds the rational, assimilative abilities of David, who, until this moment, was able to quite 
easily scoop up the exterior world of difference and interiorize it. David’s idea of the family 
(Human) founders before this sublime experience of birth which undermines representational 
closure. We do not need Lyotard or Nancy to tell us, though they do, of the sublime nature of 
birth (Nancy Birth 2; Lyotard “Unbeknownst” 47). The digestive logic (spatial, rational, 
representational, ontological) developed thus far in the essay has been turned inside-out in the 
face of this, the raw experience of birth. A Latourian reading of this moment would emphasize 
the row of davids as examples of the proliferation of nature-culture hybrids, undermining 
modernity. Such a reading is possible, but not quite as telling as what I have developed above. 
David, after all, has already murdered one other david, and the very fact that David could be 
digested by a human family indicates the incredible purifying power present in the film. Birth is 
the logical trigger for this posthuman exposure, ultimately, because of the spatial logic. If 
Humanism is defined by a rationalizing ingestion, the logical opposite, birth, is defined, literally, 
by an expulsion--the brain of the rational subject somewhere outside of itself, in the other.  
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This spatial exposure entails David’s “recognition”--one cannot in light of the experience 
described above neglect the scare quotes--that he will not become immanent, or real. While in 
the lab, David sees how all these other davids are not only constructed but also boxed; if boxes 
operates as a metaphor for subjectivity, he also sees how very insubstantial the lines we draw 
between the “inside” and “outside” are. He “recognizes” that he cannot be rid of the artificiality 
that plagues him and all humans for that matter. In this moment of representational indigestion, 
David confronts the impossibility of immediate presence, the fact that identity is born through an 
exteriority that cannot be erased. For the Humanist subject to be interrupted, digestion must stop, 
opening up the borders of the self so that the interior movement is reversed: The “self” opens to 
the outside, and to others; a posthuman ethics would begin with this spacing. With Badmington 
(Alien Chic 153) and Graham (228), I would also locate the posthuman in the spacing of 
Derridean différance. Against the rigid difference of, say, a binary between human and alien, 
what happens at this moment is that David’s representational faculties--which are on the side of 
difference--break down, confronting him with his existence in an endlessly deferred series of 
relations.  
 
Humanist Completion, Cloning, Hospitality 
Just as David gets his dream in A.I.’s final scene--immanence--and (apparently) dies, so, 
too, does humanity. Hobby informs us that it has been the dream of “man since the birth of 
science” to create a real being. David, as a tool of narrative, represents the completion of 
signification for both Hobby and the family. Monica has lost a son, prompting the desire for and 
creation of David to heal the family representation. Hobby, of course, is confronted with much 
the same circumstances as his own son’s death predates his Davidic simulacrum. This parallel 
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justifies telescoping the obsession with a familial representation onto the much larger stage of 
humanism. 
Contemporary critics of postmodernism argue that philosophy, the world, is ill (in the 
absence of its “Martin”) and has lost its hold on absolutes like God, morality, and Man (Nancy, 
Gravity 21-35). Paradoxically, it is the very charge that meaning has been lost that provides 
meaning with its vitality--to return to the dynamic of anticipation and the hermeneutic circle. 
This illness stands in for a lack that is less absent than present “at a distance.” Such an illusory 
absence is crucial as it is what creates the desire which fuels the modern project whose ultimate 
object is the presentation of an absolute Subject. Meaning (David/Martin), once returned, then 
has to move away again to ensure that this crude dialectic of lack and desire continues. 
As we have seen, Hobby’s speech inscribes a teleological history whose fulfillment, 
whose “dream” and desire, is embodied in David. His objective is the resolution of the sensible 
(David as representation) and the intelligible (the idea of Man) in which “each presents the 
other” (22-23). Assuming the chasm between the sensible and intelligible, signification is the 
absolute “resolution” of the two which, at the furthest end, amounts to “the very model of a 
structure or system that is closed upon itself,” a definition of the seamless monad (original’s 
emphasis). It is also--to point out what may be obvious by now--the utter opposite of the 
sublimity, which is defined by the impossibility of representing an otherwise intelligible idea 
(Lyotard Postmodern Condition 78). In the same way that David’s letters were an attempt to 
align the sensible (words) with the intelligible (an idea of the family), David himself operates for 
the Humanist project. As a feat of engineering David amounts to an absolute representation of 
the Humanist subject. There can be no greater Humanist feat than to make an entity that mirrors 
the self, desiring, dreaming, and lacking. By making David (really) human, the world has been 
 17 
fully represented and science can be at ease because this representation signals the end of that 
distant lack and the desire that it creates (49).  
Yet it is a profoundly disturbing success in that it is only the dialectic of lack and desire 
that creates the orientation or project that gives identity to the subject. The closure of the 
hermeneutic circle is therefore also a non-subjectival opening. First, a bit more on this limit from 
Nancy’s The Gravity of Thought:  
In its completed form, this circle is as follows: the subject of signification 
recognizes itself as the ultimate signified. This amounts to saying that the process 
or structure of signification recognizes and signifies itself as its own subject. 
Thus, the meaning of the subject . . . is situated at once in a constant and infinite 
presence-at-a-distance and in a perfect ontological identity with the subject whose 
meaning it constitutes; the uniformly evasive presence of meaning constitutes its 
substantiality. (original’s emphasis; 43-44) 
At the point of total representation, lack and its corollary, desire, are gone and with them the 
subject. What remains as a “subject” “recognizes” that identity is less immanent than a play 
between absence (“presence-at-a-distance”) and presence (“perfect ontological identity”). The 
subject “recognizes” that its substance is grounded not in signification, but in the perpetual 
movement or architecture of meaning by which signification comes into being. Subjectivity 
requires an inexhaustible lack, so that, in a way, the subject is confronted with a structural 
paradox: to complete the Humanist project is to die. When Hobby tells David that he is “real” 
because he is the first mecha to desire and dream, he explains in the simplest terms that 
subjectivity is grounded in lack. We are who we are because we are constantly projecting 
ourselves toward that illusory lack. Subjectivity is revealed, in other words, as in-sign-ificant, as 
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lacking a ground as it moves perpetually from here to there (51). Having become a real boy, his 
subjectivity is endangered along with the essential inertia that is the project of subjectivity (and 
having completed its project in David, the same is true for humanism).  
 As I have demonstrated, there is no essential difference between orga and mecha. Both 
simulate and operate hermeneutically in the world, trying to resolve the tension between the 
sensible and intelligible in a representation. Whereas humans had been able to elide this 
exposition in seamless representations, at the end of humanism this cannot be ignored: The 
recognition of “insignificance” is the signature trait of our time. This is again, to say the least, 
considerably different than Graham’s argument: Rather than an overabundance of hybrids that 
may no longer be “purified,” what we see here is a mechanical boy who is really human (at least 
in terms of Hobby’s definition)--at which point the Humanist edifice collapses.  
 A.I. focuses and furthers this discussion by foregrounding the fact of bioengineering. 
With the film’s emphasis on androids this will seem strange until it is recalled that David is an 
identical twin of Hobby’s son--as are all the davids on the manufacturing line--and that the A.I. 
at the end of the film clone Monica for a brief rendezvous with David. While David is an 
android, my analysis takes Hobby (for whom David exhibits the essential qualities of humanity) 
at his word, and uses this android’s human experience to discuss the biotechnological world that 
we humans now inhabit. The dialectic of lack and desire stalls because reproductive science 
interrupts the rational subject in two ways, both as a completion, and as a confrontation with our 
birth. Biological science has been perfected to such an extent that it not only confronts us with 
our birth, but does so incessantly due to its increasingly expansive place in society. We may be 
able, as David does, to digest one copy, but when we are confronted with the artificial manner in 
which we are born, our digestion fails and “we” are brought, finally, face to face with the 
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indigestibility of the world. The subjectival mastery over birth has made it impossible to move 
beyond a subjectival birth: Posthumanity experiences a state of constant birth.  
Cloning is not a simple extension of subjectival power. It is also an interruption of 
subjectivity and thereby a confrontation with our insubstantiality, our existence outside of 
ourselves with others. This is an endless birth because cloning is endless; innumerable davids 
can be made of one David and, more importantly, it is endless because the “subject,” in the face 
of this birth, is incapable of creating the mental representations that would reduce this reality to 
the well-bordered stability of a Human, Family, National being.  
When, for instance, Hobby informs David that he will return momentarily with David’s 
real mothers and fathers, the immanent notion of the family self is replaced with a notion of the 
self constructed via an impersonal web of communal activity. David cannot interiorize this 
“family” or “birth” in a representation when his presence is endlessly deferred. The rational mind 
cannot truly digest its relation to all humans, let alone its construction in a womb that looks more 
like a factory floor than an intimate domicile. Humanism is a sentimental myth which is exposed 
at the moment we are forced--as we are more and more--to confront our birth in the world.  
Ethically, this entails an understanding of identity as less immanent than deferred, a 
spacing in which what once was a subject--absolute, monadic, solipsistic--is now exposed to 
others. “Posthumanity” would be defined by spacing, a non-subjectival awareness of each 
singularity’s existence outside of his or her self. Opposed to the digestion of presence and 
absence seen in David’s personal path toward total signification, this exposure would interrupt 
simple immanent representations. Instead of seamless borders of self, the subject’s “interior” 
would be radically exposed. (While in the mecha shop for ingesting real food, David attempts to 
touch his chest cavity. The mechanic slaps his hand away. In this new space, hands will not be 
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swatted.) While Artificial Intelligence signals the interruption of the subject, it concomitantly 
signals the birth of a singularity whose existence is defined by “artificiality,” once this word has 
been drained of all metaphysical vestiges. Nor, lest I be misunderstood, is this a new individual, 
shorn of the past, and now somewhere simply beyond humanism, as if that were possible.  
Spielberg’s film ends with a representation of such a singularity. The A.I. at the film’s 
end, descendants of David and others of his time, while curious, do not recapitulate the obsession 
with subjectivity that is seen in humans and David. Our first telling image of this other order is 
glimpsed in their choice of transportation. Their transport, for lack of another name, is not a 
seamless representation of tin and rivets, but a rough-cut rectangle in which the seams are 
ostentatious. Nothing appears to hold the sides of this vehicle together but transparent spacing. 
Its interior is totally exposed to the outside. Having served its purpose, the ship explodes in 
dozens of pieces to be, assumedly, stacked to the side. It is a (strategically essential) 
representation to be used for a short time and abandoned. The A.I. who leave the transport 
discover David, frozen, immobile and trapped in a seamless helicopter-like bubble by contrast. 
He is foreign to them. He is an intruder, demanding and increasingly rude. Yet they remain 
hospitable. David’s alterity is not digested and put to work in the manner so well modeled by 
Martin, David, or Hobby’s humanism. When the statue of the Blue Fairy collapses at David’s 
touch, the A.I. recreate and animate her. Monica is even brought back for 24 hours of illusory 
communion with David. This is not the world of abandonment and exposure of the A.I., yet they 
acquiesce to the fantasies of this young boy. Exposed to the end of humanism, it is such a 
hospitality that beckons to us.  
 
Notes 
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1. This essay began as a chapter in my 2005 dissertation (At the Limit of 
Subjectivity: Ethics, Community, Birth, and the Posthuman in the Narratives of Thomas 
Pynchon, Samuel R. Delany, Steven Spielberg, and Joel and Ethan Coen). In light of space 
considerations, I have eliminated much of the theoretical armature. The film sustains the 
above argument, though I willingly acknowledge my theoretical debt to the work of Jean-
Luc Nancy whose language I emulate. Numerous people have read this essay along the way, 
including David Sheridan, Dawn Comer, Scott Michaelsen, Eyal Amiran, Patrick O’Donnell, and 
A.C. Goodson. Thank you all for your assistance. 
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